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HEALTH CARE AND THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS: THE LIKELIHOOD OF A
HARMONIOUS COEXISTENCE
Robin E. Remis
The application of antitrust to transactions in the health care
field has proceeded on the essential premise, shared by antitrust
enforcers and the courts, that safeguarding economic competi-
tion is as important to health care as other industries.'
The health care industry has witnessed dramatic change over the past
decade resulting in a transformation of the structure of the medical sys-
tem in the United States.2 In response to intensive competition in the
health care sector of the economy, consolidated health care facilities,3
managed care schemes,4 and integrated delivery systems5 have emerged
increasingly to the forefront.6 The possibility of decreased competition
1. David L. Meyer & Charles F. Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require
Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 177 (1994).
2. Ilene Knable Gotts, Health Care Joint Ventures and the Antitrust Laws: A Guard-
edly Optimistic Prognosis, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 169 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Joshua Rosenstein, Active Supervision of Health Care Cooperative Ven-
tures Seeking State Action Antitrust Immunity, 18 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 329, 339
(1995); Laura L. Stephens, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
Closing an Antitrust Loophole, 75 B.U. L. REV. 477, 478 (1995).
4. The managed care paradigm consists of prepayment by consumers to plan provid-
ers who contract with health care providers to render services at a capitated rate for each
plan member. See generally Robert J. Enders, Alternative Delivery Systems, in ANTITRUST
HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT AND ANALYSIS 195 (M. Elizabeth Gee ed., 1992). The most
common types of plan providers are preferred provider organizations (PPO's) and Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMO's). Id.
5. Integrated delivery systems entail packaging of services by hospitals and physicians
in order to compete for contracts with third party payors. Dean M. Harris, State Action
Immunity From Antitrust Law for Public Hospitals: The Hidden Time Bomb for Health
Care Reform 1 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
6. See Stephens, supra note 3, at 478. See also Erik Eckholm, While Congress Re-
mains Silent, Health Care Transforms Itself, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1994, at Al. During 1993
and 1994, a majority of Americans with private health insurance were enrolled in managed
care plans that limited their choice of doctors and treatments, while 65% of Americans
employed by medium and large companies were enrolled in similar plans by 1994. Addi-
tionally, at least three quarters of all physicians entered into contracts which cut their fees
and accepted oversight of their medical decisions; eighty-nine percent of physicians in
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due to such activity has led to heightened scrutiny of health care provid-
ers in light of the current federal antitrust laws.
The very framework of the restructured entities in the health care in-
dustry has provoked antitrust concerns. Hospital mergers are one exam-
ple of the manner in which the health care industry has been
transforming.7 While mergers may result in some procompetitive bene-
fits such as efficiencies in the form of economies of scale, reductions in
overhead expenses, and better integration of production facilities, the
merging of two or more hospitals in a relevant market may also decrease
competition.8 Antitrust enforcers are concerned with increased market
concentration of the merging entities, as well as the likelihood of a conse-
quential reduction in the number of competitors.' Similar concern exists
regarding alternative delivery systems which pose potential antitrust vio-
lations such as group boycotts, 10 tying arrangements," monopolization,
exclusive dealing arrangements,' 2 and price-fixing. 3
Antitrust laws were enacted to promote efficiency and encourage com-
petition while simultaneously protecting the public from anti-competitive
practices. 4 Fostering these goals is critical to effectuating a competitive
marketplace, free from self-serving conduct which would otherwise prove
detrimental to the public interest.
The federal antitrust laws do not supplant the police power of a state to
regulate the public health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Under the
state action doctrine, a state acting in its sovereign capacity may negate
the application of the federal antitrust laws by authorizing a state policy
group practice were parties to managed care contracts by 1993, as opposed to 56% in 1992.
Id.
7. See generally Toby G. Singer, Current Issues in Hospital Merger Analysis, in ANTI-
TRUST PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN A CHANGING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 127 (H. Su-
zanne Smith & John J. Miles eds., 1994) (presenting a brief history of antitrust enforcement
in hospital mergers and the effect of the hospital's financial condition and role of efficien-
cies on antitrust analysis).
8. Id. at 137-38.
9. Id. at 134.
10. See, e.g., United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 69,697 (D.N.H. 1992), affd on reh'g, 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993).
11. See generally Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (case
concerning a "tying arrangement").
12. Idt
13. See generally Sarah S. Vance, Alternative Delivery Systems: Antitrust Issues Impli-
cated by Nonprice Restraints, in ANTITRUST PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN A CHANGING
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 219 (discussing nonprice issues raised by alterna-
tive systems).
14. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
Health Care and the Federal Antitrust Laws
which may displace competition. 5 At least eighteen states have enacted
legislation providing antitrust immunity for various sectors of the health
care industry pursuant to the state action exemption. 16 "Existing law rec-
ognizes that antitrust principles must yield when a state ... regulatory
regime displaces competition."' 7
Advocates for the reformation of the antitrust laws argue that the only
method of resolving the conflict between the antitrust laws and the struc-
ture of the health care industry entails a reexamination of the application
of the current antitrust laws.'" This position, however, fails to acknowl-
edge the importance and the underlying purpose of the federal antitrust
laws. Reformation of the antitrust laws is unnecessary to respond to the
changes occurring in the health care industry. The federal antitrust laws,
as presently written and enforced, "provide a great degree of flexibility
for private collaborative efforts aimed at achieving more efficient and less
costly delivery of health care services" and thus, should be applied to
safeguard economic competition in the health care industry.19 The flexi-
bility of the federal antitrust laws, coupled with the ability of states to
replace competition with state regulation under the state action doctrine,
support the thesis that there should not be blanket immunity from the
federal antitrust laws for the health care industry as proposed by many
economists and health care professionals.2"
This Article analyzes the efficacy of the state action doctrine as a mech-
anism for state regulation of the health care industry. Part I examines the
pertinent federal antitrust laws and the rationale underlying these laws.
Part II traces the roots of the state action doctrine and evaluates the spe-
cific components required to qualify for immunity. Part III appraises the
immunization of state regulatory programs under the state action exemp-
tion, as illustrated by the health care legislation enacted in Oregon. Fi-
nally, this Article concludes that the health care industry may respond
15. See generally 1 Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION $ 211-212 (1978) (provid-
ing a detailed analysis of the mechanics of the state action doctrine). See also 6 Julian 0.
von Kalinowski, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §§ 40.01-05 (1995) (providing
information on the origin and elements of the state action doctrine).
16. Harris, supra note 5, at 3.
17. Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 171 n.7.
18. See, e.g., Fredric J. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an Appropri-
ate Antitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 107 (1994). See also Brian McCormick,
Some New Antitrust Leeway: But AMA Says Updated Federal Rules Still Too Narrow for
Physicians, 37 Am. Med. News, Oct. 17, 1994, at 1, 31.
19. Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 169.
20. Id.
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effectively to new trends in the market without an unqualified exemption
for the health care industry from the federal antitrust laws.
I. THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS As RELATED To REGULATION OF
COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
[Federal antitrust law] rests on the premise that the unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of
our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time pro-
viding an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.E'
Competition is the product of efficient production of quality goods and
services by sellers at prices that consumers are willing to pay.22 "A cen-
tral goal of the antitrust laws is to permit markets to operate in a manner
which results in the setting of competitive prices."'23
The health care market is unique, albeit imperfect, in that the services
rendered to consumers are frequently paid for through health insurance
plans or by third-party payors, thus insulating consumers from the actual
cost of such services.24 In addition, consumers often rely on health care
providers to recommend purchases because many patients are incapable
of assessing the quality and necessity of services. 25 Consequently, there
has been less pressure for health care providers to offer services at re-
duced prices in order to maintain market shares and maximize profits.26
Thus, because of the presence of third-party payors, the price of health
services is not the product of horizontal competition among sellers or
purchasers and vertical bargaining between sellers and purchasers.
Recently, the structural changes in the health care industry have made
the marketplace more competitive. Anti-competitive mergers and collu-
sive behavior have become more prevalent, however, as a result of in-
creased competition.27 Such practices have jeopardized the future of
health care reform as well as provoked concern among antitrust enforc-
ers. "[C]ompetition in health care must be preserved and enhanced, de-
21. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
22. See JOHN H. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS, A PRIMER
(1993).
23. Craig D. Bachman, Per Se Offenses, in ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT
AND ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 4.
24. Harris, supra note 5, at 11.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 14.
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spite the need for some regulatory controls to remedy imperfections in
the market."2 The means by which competition should be preserved is
by enforcement of the antitrust laws, which were enacted for exactly that
purpose.
A. The Relevant Federal Antitrust Laws
The Sherman Antitrust Act, the first federal antitrust statute, was
passed in 1890 to block combinations formed "with the purpose or effect
of restraining trade."2 9 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits agree-
ments that unreasonably restrain trade.3" As provided in the Act,
"[e]very contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal."31 Section 2 outlaws monopolies as well as attempts or con-
spiracies to monopolize.32
The Clayton Act was enacted approximately twenty-five years after the
adoption of the Sherman Act in order to "arrest the creation of trusts,
conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before consunma-
tion."'33 Section 2 of the Clayton Act, which was replaced by Section 1 of
the Robinson-Patman Act, prohibits:
discriminat[ion] in price between different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality ... where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly ... or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly re-
ceives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of
either of them.'
Section 3 of the Act prohibits tying and exclusive dealing agreements
where the effect may be to "substantially lessen competition or tend to
28. Id. at 10.
29. Stephens, supra note 3, at 483.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
31. Id.
32. Id. at § 2. Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a
corporation, or if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
33. S. REP. No. 63-698, at 1 (1914).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1996).
1996]
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create a monopoly." 5 Finally, Section 7 outlaws certain acquisitions of
stock or assets of one business by another, having an anti-competitive
effect on the market.36 In order to invalidate conduct pursuant to the
Clayton Act, there must exist a reasonable probability, as opposed to a
theoretical possibility,37 that the challenged conduct may "substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce."
38
1. The Per Se Analysis
There are two types of inquiries by which courts analyze the unreason-
ableness of restraints.39 Some restraints are considered per se unlawful
"because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any re-
deeming virtue [and thus] are conclusively presumed to be unreasona-
ble."4 Courts do not evaluate the factual circumstances in determining
the reasonableness of such restraints, but focus solely on whether conduct
occurred which is known to pose a serious threat to competition. The per
se rule rests on the inherent unreasonableness of certain activities that
"raise extreme risk of antitrust liability without regard to [their] actual
measured effect on competition and without regard to the purpose, how-
ever laudable, with which [such activities were] undertaken."41 Price-fix-
ing, division of markets, and boycotts are examples of per se violations.42
2. The Rule of Reason Analysis
The reasonableness of other activities is determined under the rule of
reason analysis. Under this approach, courts evaluate the relevant cir-
cumstances and determine whether the anti-competitive effects outweigh
the procompetitive benefits.43 Factors considered in the rule of reason
analysis include market share, the impact of the challenged restraint on
price and output, the ease of entry into the market for new participants,
35. Id. § 14.
36. Id. § 18.
37. SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 22, at 20.
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18 (1996).
39. SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 22, at 15.
40. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
41. Bachman, supra note 23, at 4. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940) (case involving the indictment and conviction of corporations and indi-
viduals for violation of §1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
42. See generally ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL (4th ed. 1994) (providing an overview of antitrust law and
economics).
43. SHENEFIELD & STELZER, supra note 22, at 16.
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and the exigency of the restriction for reaching efficiency goals."
B. Application of the Federal Antitrust Laws to the Health
Care Industry
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that learned professions
should be exempt from the federal antitrust laws,45 and consequently
held that the antitrust laws apply to the health care industry.46 The Court
noted, however, that special accommodations may be necessary concern-
ing practices by professions.47
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distin-
guished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining
whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently.48
The health care industry has received special attention from antitrust
enforcers, as evidenced by the issuance of the Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in
the Health Care Area.49 These new policy guidelines establish "antitrust
safety zones" for six specific areas of the industry, delineating areas that
will not face scrutiny by the agencies, except in "extraordinary circum-
stances." 50
[Both the FTC and the Antitrust Division have acted on several
44. GELLHORN & KoVAcIc, supra note 42, at 169.
45. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 771, 773 (1975). The Court concluded that
"[tihe nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sher-
man Act ... nor is the public-service aspect of professional practice controlling in deter-
mining whether §1 includes professions." Id. at 787.
46. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (holding that an
agreement setting maximum prices charged to policy holders among physicians was per se
unlawful).
47. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787 n.17.
48. Id.
49. Dep't of Justice & FTC Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in
the Health Care Area, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,150-51 (Sept. 15, 1993) [hereinafter
Dep't of Justice & FTC Statements].
50. Id. See generally Roxane Busey et al., Analysis of Department of Justice and Fed-
eral Trade Commission's Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health Care Area,
in ANTrrIRusT PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN A CHANGING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra
1996]
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occasions to eliminate boycotts by physicians and other profes-
sionals of innovative alternatives to traditional fee-for-service
medicine. "These enforcement actions implicitly manifest a
strong desire to encourage rather than prohibit or chill the for-
mation of efficient provider networks."'"
The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 provides additional protec-
tion by shielding local government agencies, including municipal hospi-
tals, from liability in antitrust suits.52 The Joint Statements are designed
to achieve a "balance between efficient integrations which can benefit
consumers and anti-competitive concentrations of market power."
53
In the context of the health care industry, several activities pose poten-
tial antitrust problems. Examples of challenged conduct include coopera-
tive agreements and integration among competitors,54  collusive
horizontal agreements disguised as joint ventures, concerted refusals to
deal,5 5 and mergers.5 6 While it may seem likely that many activities will
be challenged by antitrust enforcement agencies, this is not the case.
These agencies recognize that some of the requisite factors for establish-
ing a claim would be lacking, 7 or that the procompetitive benefits of
much of this conduct would outweigh the anti-competitive effects.58
Moreover, the existence of "antitrust safety zones" announced in the De-
partment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforce-
ment Policy Statements confirms that activities falling within such zones
note 7, at 127 (providing history of antitrust enforcement in hospital mergers and the effect
of the hospital's financial condition on antitrust analysis and the role of efficiencies).
51. Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 184.
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1984).
53. Janet L. McDavid, Antitrust Issues in Health Care Reform, 43 DEPAUL L. REV.
1045, 1067 (1994).
54. See, e.g., Medical Staff of Broward Gen. Medical Ctr. & Medical Staff of Holy
Cross Hosp.; Prohibited Trade Practices and Affirmative Corrective Actions, 56 Fed. Reg.
49,184 (1991) (precluding medical staffs from entering or attempting to enter into agree-
ments that would restrict other providers from offering or rendering health care services).
55. See, e.g., Debes Corp.: Proposed Consent Agreement with Analysis to Aid Public
Comment, 57 Fed. Reg. 39, 205 (1992) (banning a boycott of certain nurse registries by a
nursing home); Medical Staff of Doctors' Hosp. of Prince George's County, 110 F.T.C. 476
(1988) (prohibiting the boycott of a hospital intending to open an HMO).
56. See McDavid, supra note 53, at 1061-66.
57. See American Bar Association Working Group on Health Care Reform, Antitrust
Implications of Health Care Reform 1 n.2 (1993) (noting that antitrust enforcers have not
challenged most hospital mergers because it is likely that they would lack sufficient market
power to exclude competition or raise prices) (on file with author)..
58. See supra note 49, at 1 13,151 (reporting that only 8 of 200 hospital mergers have
been challenged from 1990 - 1994).
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will not be challenged.59 The antitrust laws safeguard competition in the
health care sector while simultaneously allowing the industry to respond
to recent structural changes, and thus a harmonious coexistence is both
possible and beneficial.
II. IMMUNIZATION FROM THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS UNDER
THE STATE AcTION DOCrRINE
The power of the states to promote the health and welfare of their
citizens has not been superseded by the federal antitrust laws. 60 "In the
American federalist system, the states have the power and the right to
regulate their internal markets in matters constituting their local concern
.... ,"61 The antitrust laws may be preempted under the state action doc-
trine upon a finding that a state regulatory scheme which displaces com-
petition is clearly articulated by a state acting in its sovereign capacity.
"[F]rom its inception, the state action doctrine has been rooted in feder-
alism principles that value deference to the economic self-determination
of states."62
A. Establishment of the State Action Doctrine
The state action doctrine was instituted in 1943, in Parker v. Brown,
where the Supreme Court announced that the Sherman Act was not in-
tended to quash the regulatory power of the states. 63 "We find nothing
in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that
its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its legislature."'  In Parker, the Court upheld a restraint on
trade that was imposed by the California legislature, noting that the Sher-
man Act did not render the state regulation unlawful because the Act is a
"prohibition of individual and not state action. "65
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
the Supreme Court set forth the "Midcal two prong test" which is applied
in evaluating whether conduct falls within the state action exemption.66
59. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89 n.17 (1975).
60. BARRY KELLMAN, PRIVATE ANTTRUST LITIGATION 198 (1985).
61. Id.
62. Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Defer-
ential Economic Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REv. 227, 230 (1987).
63. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
64. Id. at 350-51.
65. Id. at 352.
66. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980).
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Depending on the characterization of the actor, a reviewing court must
initially determine the status of the actor, and subsequently evaluate the
challenged restraint, either solely under the first prong or under both
prongs of the Midcal test.
The first prong requires that the challenged restraint be "one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy."67 Secondly, the
state policy must be "'actively supervised' by the State itself."68 These
two requirements ensure that the state authorized the challenged conduct
by displacing competition with regulation, while retaining ultimate con-
trol in policing this conduct, and thus protecting the interests of the
public.
The purpose of the antitrust laws, to safeguard the public by preserving
a competitive marketplace, is not compromised by the availability of the
state action exemption from the antitrust laws. There is a presumption
that states act in the public interest, and thus, the purpose is not thwarted
upon preemption of the antitrust laws.69 The danger of public harm in-
creases the more removed the actor, engaged in anti-competitive conduct,
is from the state.
Where a private party is engaging in the anti-competitive ac-
tivity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own
interests, rather than the governmental interests of the State.
Where the actor is a municipality,... [t]he only real danger is
that it will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the
expense of more overriding state goals.7"
Recognition of this principle has prompted the Supreme Court to refine
the requirements for qualification under the state action exemption since
its inception over fifty years ago.7'
B. Three Categories of Actors Under State Action Inquiry
Entities have been divided into three categories for purposes of judicial
67. Id. at 105 (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978)).
68. Id.
69. See Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985). See also Patrick v. Burget,. 486 U.S.
94 (1988).
70. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
71. See Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38-
40; Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-69 (1984); Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 103-06;
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408-13 (1978); Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977).
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review: states acting pursuant to sovereign powers; public entities acting
pursuant to state-delegated authority; and, private actors. 72
1. States Acting as Sovereign
There are three separate tests employed to determine if a restraint
qualifies for state action immunity, depending on the status of the entity
engaged in the challenged conduct.73 The first category involves direct
acts of a state as sovereign, which are deemed per se immune from anti-
trust scrutiny.74 State legislatures and state supreme courts, acting in a
legislative capacity, are entitled to ipso facto exemption from the opera-
tion of the federal antitrust laws. 75 "When the conduct is that of the sov-
ereign itself[,] ... the danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not
arise." 76
2. Public Entities-Acting Pursuant to State-Delegated Authority
When states delegate to public entities such as municipalities or public
hospitals, the authority to engage in anti-competitive behavior, such enti-
ties must act pursuant to a "'clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed state policy' to replace competition with regulation" in order to
enjoy immunity under the state action doctrine. 7 Public entities do not
enjoy absolute immunity from the antitrust laws solely by virtue of their
status.7" "If municipalities were free to make economic choices coun-
seled solely by their own parochial interests and without regard to their
anti-competitive effects, a serious chink in the armor of antitrust protec-
tion would be introduced at odds with the comprehensive national policy
72. Einer R. Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REv. 668, 673
(1991).
73. Id.
74. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
75. Bates, 433 U.S. at 360 (holding that a state supreme court acting in a legislative,
rather than judicial capacity, is exempt from Sherman Act liability under the state action
doctrine).
76. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569.
77. Id. (quoting Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982)).
78. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1977).
When cities, each of the same status under state law, are equally free to approach
a policy decision in their own way, the anti-competitive restraints adopted as pol-
icy by any one of them, may express its own preference, rather than that of the
State. Therefore, in the absence of evidence that the State authorized or directed
a given municipality to act as it did, the actions of a particular city hardly can be
found to be pursuant to the "state's command," or to be restraints that the "state
as ... sovereign" imposed.
Id. at 414.
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Congress established. 79
To receive immunity from the antitrust laws, a municipality must
demonstrate that its anti-competitive conduct clearly was authorized by
the state.80 "The determination that a municipality's activities constitute
state action is not a purely formalistic inquiry; the State may not validate
a municipality's anti-competitive conduct simply by declaring it to be law-
ful."'" Rather, it must demonstrate that a clearly expressed state policy
to displace competition exists.8 2
In assessing whether a political subdivision is acting pursuant to spe-
cific state authorization, it is unnecessary for the municipality to "be able
to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization." 3 Requiring
courts to delve into the intent of the state legislature "would embroil the
federal courts in the unnecessary interpretation of state statutes ... [and]
would undercut the fundamental policy of Parker and the state action
doctrine of immunizing state action from federal antitrust scrutiny."' '
The state policy simply must evidence "that the legislature contemplated
the kind of action complained of." 5 Upon demonstrating that such con-
duct was foreseeable by the state in delegating its authority, the "clear
articulation" requirement is satisfied.8 6
Foreseeability does not have to be expressly declared by the state legis-
lature, but may be inferred from statutory structure. In Hallie v. Eau
Claire, the Supreme Court analyzed a Wisconsin statute regulating the
provision of sewage services by municipalities, which was alleged to un-
lawfully replace competition with regulation. 7 The Court, concluding
that the challenged statutes "clearly contemplate that a city may engage
in anti-competitive conduct" because such conduct was the foreseeable
result of the power delegated to the municipality by the state legislature,
held that the municipality satisfied this first prong of the Midcal test. 8
The danger of harm inflicted on the public due to anti-competitive con-
79. Id. at 407.
80. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38-39.
81. Id. at 39.
82. Id. at 40. See Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982)
(holding that Colorado's delegation of general authority to a municipality was neutral and
thus failed to satisfy the "clear articulation" component of the state action test).
83. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415.
84. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 44 n.7.
85. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (quoting 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
86. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 43.
87. Id. at 47.
88. Id. at 42.
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duct by a public entity is minimal. "[B]ecause a municipality is an arm of
the [s]tate, [the courts] ... may presume, absent a showing to the con-
trary, that the municipality acts in the public interest."89 Consequently, it
is unnecessary for a state to supervise actively the conduct of public enti-
ties acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.9 In dispensing
with this requirement, the Supreme Court stated that "[o]nce it is clear
that state authorization exists, there is no need to require the [s]tate to
supervise actively the municipality's execution of what is a properly dele-
gated function."'" Thus, public entities must satisfy only the first prong
of the Midcal test in order to receive state action immunity.
3. Private Actors Engaging in Anti-competitive Behavior
Private parties engaged in anti-competitive conduct pose a more seri-
ous threat to the public interest. "Where a private party is engaging in
the anti-competitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to
further his own interests .... As a result, both prongs of the Midcal
test must be satisfied in order for a private party to be entitled to state
action immunity.93 "For States which do choose to displace the free mar-
ket with regulation, [the] insistence on real compliance with both parts of
the Midcal test will serve to make clear that the State is responsible for
the [anti-competitive activity] it has sanctioned and undertaken to con-
trol." 94 A state's ultimate control over private conduct will ensure that
only certain anti-competitive activities of private parties are authorized
by the state and actually further state regulatory policies. Thus, the un-
derlying purpose of the antitrust laws is still being served.95
"[Wihile a State may not confer antitrust immunity on private persons
by fiat, it may displace competition . . . if the displacement is both in-
tended by the State and implemented in its specific details.",96 A state
must create the machinery for establishing a program that foreseeably
may displace competition in a particular industry in order to satisfy the
89. Id. at 45.
90. IaM at 47.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); Patrick v.
Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1987); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
94. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636.
95. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100-01 (quoting Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46-47).
96. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992).
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first prong of the Midcal test.97 "[A] state does not give immunity to
those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or
by declaring that their action is lawful."" s To confer immunity upon a
private party, the court must be convinced that the party specifically was
authorized by a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state pol-
icy, and not acting pursuant to a facially neutral statute.
The active supervision prong guarantees that a state retains ultimate
control and plays a substantial role in carrying out the state policy.99 As
illustrated by case law,
[t]he active supervision prong of the Midcal test requires that
state officials have and exercise power to review particular anti-
competitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail
to accord with state policy. Absent such a program of supervi-
sion, there is no realistic assurance that a private party's anti-
competitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely
the party's individual interests.'
Thus, a state may not simply relinquish its power in authorizing certain
anti-competitive activities; it must review continuously such activities and
remain empowered to withdraw its authorization upon a finding that
state regulatory policies are no longer being furthered.
In Patrick v. Burget, the Supreme Court concluded that the activities of
hospital peer review committees were not subject to adequate state su-
pervision, and thus not entitled to state action immunity.10 1 Stating that
the mere presence of some state involvement will not suffice to demon-
strate active supervision, 102 the Court noted that the Oregon statute
failed to establish a scheme by.which state actors could review "private
decisions regarding hospital privileges to determine whether such deci-
sions comport with state regulatory policy and to correct abuses.'
10 3
The active supervision requirement commands that the state retain ulti-
mate control.10 4
Where ... the state's program is in place, is staffed and funded,
97. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
98. Id. at 351.
99. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc., 471 U.S. at 48, 51.
100. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 634 (quoting Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101).
101. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 102-03.
102. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.7 (1987) (holding that the state
must retain the power to exert significant control over the challenged restraint in order to
satisfy the active supervision requirement).
103. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
104. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc., 471 U.S. at 51.
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grants to the state officials ample power and the duty to regulate
pursuant to declared standards of state policy, is enforceable in
the state's courts, and demonstrates some basic level of activity
directed towards seeing that the private actors carry out the
state's policy and not simply their own policy, more need not be
established.1"5
Such protracted control by the state assures that the purpose of the anti-
trust laws will not be extinguished by private parties acting to the detri-
ment of the public while simultaneously furthering their own interests.
C. State Action Immunity in the Health Care Sector
In the context of the health care industry, the state action doctrine has
been raised successfully as a defense in litigation concerning activities of
health care purchasers, sellers, and suppliers. 1°6 More than one-third of
the states have provided state action immunity pursuant to regulatory
programs authorizing cooperative activities such as joint ventures and
hospital mergers. 0 7 While some critics assert that the prerequisites for
immunization under the state action doctrine are ambiguous and thus do
not assure exemption from the antitrust laws,' this contention is falla-
cious. The requirements for qualification have been clearly set forth and
refined by the Supreme Court since the establishment of the state action
exemption in Parker.10 9 For states that enact programs in accordance
with these requirements, the state action doctrine provides a viable and
efficacious means of furnishing immunity from the antitrust laws for both
public and private entities in the health care industry."10
105. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 637 (quoting New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 908 F.2d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 1990)).
106. Harris, supra note 5, at 24.
107. U.S. General Accounting Office, FEDERAL AND STATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS CON-
CERNING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY, at 2-3, 10 (1994). See, e.g., 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-
129; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 1881-1888 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2911
(West 1994); 1993 N.Y. Laws ch. 731; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3727.21 (Anderson 1995).
See Sarah S. Vance, Immunity for State-Sanctioned Provider Collaboration After Ticor, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 409 (1994).
108. Harris, supra note 5, at 43.
109. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943).
110. See, e.g., Sandy River Nursing Care v. Aetna Casualty, 985 F.2d 1138, 1146-47 (1st
Cir. 1993) (upholding state insurance rate making system on grounds of state action immu-
nity); Cohn v. Bond, 953 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1230 (1992) (af-
firming summary judgment for public hospitals and its medical staff pursuant to the state
action doctrine); Brazil v. Arkansas Bd. of Dental Examiners, 593 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D.
Ark. 1984) (holding a private state dental association that recommended appointments to
the state board pursuant to state law was immune from antitrust scrutiny).
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III. STATE HEALTH CARE REFORM LEGISLATION
There is a myriad of legislation that has been enacted by states to influ-
ence activity in the health care marketplace. "Any willing provider", laws
are one example of legislative relief for health care providers.'1 ' Such
legislation requires third-party payors to permit any provider willing to
accept the rates agreed upon between the payor and preferred providers
to participate in the health plan. Such legislation may have anti-competi-
tive effects because:112
there is less incentive for any facility or practitioner to give a
discount in order to become a 'preferred provider.' Therefore,
this type of law makes it more difficult for the payor to obtain a
discount from any provider, and interferes with the competitive
bidding process in managed care contracting." 3
A. Antitrust Immunity Provisions in Health Care Legislation
Under the Midcal two prong test, a state regulatory program will qual-
ify for state action exemption upon a finding that there exists a "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy to replace competi-
tion with regulation. 114 In the case of private actors, the state also must
be engaged in active supervision and retain "ultimate control" over the
anti-competitive restraint. 115
Many states have enacted statutes providing legislative relief for health
care programs that potentially may conflict with the federal antitrust
laws. The regulatory programs which have been created provide health
care market participants with the requisite flexibility necessary to re-
spond to increased competition by authorizing cooperative action under
the state action doctrine in particularized situations." 6 To ensure that the
111. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.706 (West Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 41-3937
(Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-617 (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407
(Michie Supp. 1995).
112. "'[A]ny willing provider' requirements may discourage competition among provid-
ers, in turn raising prices to consumers and unnecessarily restricting consumer choice in
prepaid health care programs, without providing any substantial public benefit." Letter
from Michael 0. Wise, Acting Director of the Federal Trade Commission Office of Con-
sumer and Competition Advocacy, to Honorable Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of
Montana (Feb. 4, 1993), at 7 (on file with Janet McDavid at Hogan & Hartson, Washing-
ton, D.C.).
113. Harris, supra note 5, at 20-21.
114. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
115. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105; Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
116. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62J.2911 to 62J.46 (West Supp. 1994).
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laws promulgated will pass muster, some states have expressly included in
the statute their intentions to immunize certain conduct from antitrust
scrutiny pursuant to the state action doctrine. 117 Thus, the state intention
to displace competition is articulated clearly, expressed affirmatively, and
there is no ambiguity concerning whether the anti-competitive effects
were foreseeable." 8
Antitrust immunity provisions should address three specific areas to
help assure that the Midcal two prong test is satisfied. The legislation
should include "[a] detailed statutory scheme framing the immunity pro-
cess requirements.""' 9 While specific, detailed legislative authorization is
not a prerequisite to a finding of a clearly articulated state policy, 2 0 such
a pronounced delineation would guarantee a finding that the state in-
tended to displace competition. "As long as the State as sovereign clearly
intends to displace competition in a particular field with a regulatory
structure, the first prong of the Midcal test is satisfied.' 2'
Secondly, a state regulatory scheme should enumerate "the goals that
the anti-competitive conduct is to achieve and requir[e] that a number of
those goals be met.' 22 Announcing such goals and defining a minimum
that must be satisfied in order to enjoy immunity pursuant to the state
policy illustrates that the state is actively involved and is seeking to fur-
ther the public interest. 23 "The requirement is designed to ensure that
the state action doctrine will shelter only the particular anti-competitive
acts.., that, in the judgment of the State, actually further state regulatory
policies." 124
Finally, the state policy should set forth "a detailed application, ap-
proval, and review process that focuses on the public interest.' '125 Such
evidence will demonstrate that the state retains ultimate control over the
authorized anti-competitive conduct. The state scheme must provide
more than the potential to supervise the activity; there must be evidence
of actual state involvement and decision making authority. 126 One exam-
117. Rosenstein, supra note 3, at 331.
118. Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
119. Stephanie M. Harper, Quest for Antitrust Immunity: Oregon, Health Care, and the
State Action Doctrine, 31 WILLIAMETrE L. REv. 89, 116 (1995).
120. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978).
121. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 64 (1985).
122. See generally Harper, supra note 119, at 116.
123. Id. at 112.
124. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634 (1992).
125. Harper, supra note 119, at 116.
126. Rosenstein, supra note 3, at 336.
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pie of state control, which has been found to satisfy the active supervision
requirement, is explicit statutory authorization to review decisions made
by those engaged in the anti-competitive conduct, coupled with the power
to overturn those activities that do not adhere to the goals of the state
policy.1 27
Some critics claim that inconsistent legal standards are applied by the
courts leaving the state action doctrine unpredictable, and thus another
solution should be sought.128 The courts have defined, however, the ele-
ments required for qualification during the evolution of the state action
doctrine and have clearly spelled out what will suffice in fulfilling these
elements. Satisfaction of the components of the Midcal test will provide
adequate security for states seeking to regulate particular facets of indus-
tries under the state action doctrine.
Many commentators defend the Midcal test as a "relatively sensible
compromise between the judiciary's obligation to respect the results of
the democratic process at the state level and its obligation to respect that
same process at the national level.' 129 So long as states clearly set forth
their intentions to displace competition and provide adequate supervision
where necessary, there shall be no ambiguity concerning qualification for
state action immunity.
B. The Oregon Health Plan
Oregon has enacted a regulatory program that illustrates the frame-
work through which a state may confer state action immunity to further
the public interest by permitting conduct that may otherwise violate the
antitrust laws.'3 ° In seeking to protect the public interest, Oregon has
attempted to regulate the transplant market by enacting a cooperative
heart and kidney transplant program.' 3'
The transplant market is unique in that the number of organ trans-
plants that may be performed is strictly limited by the supply of organs.
Health care providers therefore lack the freedom to respond to demand
because they exercise no control over the supply. In addition, the gravity
of the activity mandates that transplant centers offer high quality services.
As a result, fostering competition in this market would prove detrimental
127. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
128. Harris, supra note 5, at 23.
129. Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Polit-
ical Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 501 (1986).
130. OR. REv. STAT. § 442.715 (1995).
131. Id. §§ 442.700 - 442.760.
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to the public because an increased number of market participants would
result in a duplication of services of potentially lower caliber perform-
ance, 32 causing increased prices and inefficiency.3 3
The Oregon state legislature intervened by adopting legislation that au-
thorizes the formation of cooperative programs thereby displacing com-
petition among health care providers. 34 The statute specifies that only
Oregon Health Sciences University, originally the sole provider of heart
and kidney transplant services, and those entities operating at least three
hospitals in a single urban area qualify for eligibility in the cooperative
program.135 Thus by limiting participation in the program, the legislature
clearly intended to replace competition with regulation. Because the
state legislature clearly contemplated that participants in the program
may engage in anti-competitive conduct, the state policy satisfies the first
prong of the Midcal test.
136
The Oregon legislature explicated the goals of the cooperative program
and established a minimum number that must be fulfilled. 137 The stated
goals are:
(a) reduction of, or protection against, rising costs of heart
and kidney transplant services;
(b) reduction of, or protection against, rising prices for heart
and kidney transplant services;
(c) improvement or maintenance of the quality of heart and
kidney transplant services provided in this state;
(d) reduction of, or protection against, duplication of re-
sources including, without limitation, expensive medical special-
ists, medical equipment and sites of service;
(e) improvement or maintenance of efficiency in the delivery
of heart and kidney transplant services;
(f) improvement or maintenance of public access to heart and
kidney transplant services;
(g) increase in donations of organs for transplantation; and
(h) improvement in the continuity of patient care. 138
132. See Jeffrey D. Hosenpud, M.D. et al., The Effect of Transplant Center Volume on
Cardiac Transplant Outcome, 271 JAMA 1844, 1847-48 (1994).
133. Harper, supra note 119, at 104.
134. OR. REv. STAT. § 442.705(1).
135. Id.
136. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978) (quoting 532
F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
137. OR. REv. STAT. § 442.710(4)(a).
138. Id. § 442.705(2).
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If a participant fails to demonstrate that certain goals have been or will be
achieved, eligibility will be abrogated.139 The goals clearly indicate that
the program will serve the public interest, and unconditional disqualifica-
tion of an entity failing to act in the public interest provides an adequate
measure for safeguarding the state's purpose behind the regulation.
The legislation sets forth specific application requirements for potential
participants, including a description by participants, of potential anti-
competitive activities in which they foresee engaging. 4 ° The Director of
the Department of Human Resources (hereinafter "Director") reviews
all applications and issues an order to those applicants satisfying the re-
quirements of the state policy.141
Upon a finding that the program's goals further the state policy and
serve the public interest, the director issues an order stating such conclu-
sions." The order authorizes participants to engage in certain anti-com-
petitive conduct,143 while delineating the limits of such authorization. 1'
The Oregon legislation clearly illustrates affirmative action by the state as
required for state action immunity. 145
The compliance and enforcement provisions of the statute provide une-
quivocal evidence of active state supervision.146 The statute mandates
the establishment of a board of governors, comprised of executive of-
ficers of each health care provider participant and the Director, who must
devise program policies and a budget. 47 The Director retains power to
veto the budget proposal if it is found to conflict with the goals of the
state program.' 48 The Director also reviews annual reports submitted by
the board describing the extent to which the programs comply with the
order and attain state goals.' 49
The Director exercises ultimate authority over the implementation of
the program. The Director is empowered to impose such remedies as
issuing cease and desist orders or withdrawing immunity from any parties
139. Id. § 442.710 (5),(8).
140. Id. § 442.710(4).
141. Id. §§ 442.710(4)(a),(b).
142. Id. § 442.710(7)(e).
143. Id. §§ 442.710(7)(a),(b).
144. Id. § 442.710(6).
145. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 574 (1984) ("The reason that state action is
immune from Sherman Act liability is not that the State has chosen to act in an anti-
competitive fashion, but that the State itself has chosen to act.") (emphasis added).
146. OR. REv. STAT. § 442.705.
147. Id §§ 442.720(2),(3).
148. Id. § 442.720(4).
149. Id. §§ 442.725(1),(2); § 442.730(1)(a).
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acting beyond the scope of the order. °5 0 Such protective measures thwart
the threat of harm to the public, stemming from unauthorized behavior.
The Oregon legislation clearly satisfies the second prong of the Midcal
test as evidenced by the fact that the director "ha[s] and exercise[s] power
to review particular anti-competitive acts of private parties and [to] disap-
prove those that fail to accord with state policy."''
The Oregon transplant program is an exemplary model of a state policy
to replace competition with regulation which is entitled to state action
immunity. The legislation possesses the essential elements for antitrust
immunity as set forth in Midcal.'52 As evidenced by the legislative
scheme adopted in Oregon, the state action doctrine is a viable option for
states seeking to regulate the health care industry. 53
IV. CONCLUSION
Unqualified exemption from the federal antitrust laws for the health
care industry is unnecessary to safeguard public welfare. Health care
programs established in response to the dramatic changes that have been
occurring recently will not be per se invalidated due to antitrust concerns.
Both the antitrust safety zones set forth in the Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements,5 4
and the availability of exemption from the antitrust laws under the state
action doctrine' 55 strike an acceptable balance between the underlying
purpose of the antitrust laws and the need to displace competition in the
health care industry. 56 Blanket immunity from the federal antitrust laws
is both unnecessary and inordinate.
The goal of the antitrust laws is to promote efficiency, while simultane-
ously protecting the public from anti-competitive practices. 5 7 This goal
may be realized in the health care industry despite the fact that the
choices of consumers are often controlled by external variables that do
150. Id. §§ 442.740(l)(b),(4),(6).
151. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
152. California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
153. Other states have successfully enacted health care legislation containing state ac-
tion immunity provisions. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-32-2701 - 24-32-3715 (West
Supp. 1994); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62.2911 - 62J.46 (West Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 43.72.005 to 43.72.914 (West Supp. 1994).
154. Dep't of Justice & FTC Statements, supra note 49, at 13,150.
155. Harris, supra note 5, at 3.
156. See Jorde, supra note 62, at 229, 247-50.
157. See POSNER, supra note 14.
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not exist in other markets. 158 However, under some circumstances, dis-
placing competition in the health care market may sometimes prove ben-
eficial to the public. Pursuant to such a finding, the state may intervene
and replace competition with regulation. 159 In such instances, the federal
antitrust laws shall be set aside and the conduct authorized by the state
will be insulated from antitrust scrutiny. 160
The state action doctrine exempts both state and private conduct car-
ried out pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. 161 Private conduct
must be "actively supervised" by the state and shall be subject to continu-
ous scrutiny in order to qualify for immunity from the antitrust laws.' 62
"Only if an anti-competitive act of a private party meets both of these
requirements is it fairly attributable to the State.' 163
Some argue that the elements for exemption as set out in Midcal are
unclear, and thus, there is no guarantee of immunity for anti-competitive
conduct undertaken upon reliance on the state action doctrine."M While
the courts have not laid out an exact formula defining what constitutes
the requisite factors guaranteeing immunity under the Midcal test, the
ingredients needed to satisfy the Midcal test have been illustrated and
refined by the courts in recent years.' 65 As demonstrated by the Oregon
legislature, it is possible to enact a state policy displacing competition so
long as the legislative intent is clear, and the state retains ultimate control
over such activity. 166 Thus, the state action doctrine safely may be relied
upon as a mechanism for addressing the issues that arise in the health
care marketplace.
In drafting legislation, states may guarantee antitrust immunity by ex-
pressly conveying their intent to displace competition in an antitrust im-
munity provision. There will be no ambiguity as to the intentions of the
state, and the first prong of the Midcal test undoubtedly will be satis-
158. Harris, supra note 5, at 11.
159. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943).
160. Martin J. Thompson & Samuel Hirsch, Exemptions and Immunities, in ANTITRUST
HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT AND ANALYSIS, supra note 4, at 25.
161. Id. at 29.
162. Rosenstein, supra note 3, at 331; see generally Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title
Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992) (reiterating the two-part test applicable to action by
private parties adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Midcal).
163. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988).
164. Harris, supra note 5, at 23.
165. See generally Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) (holding that active state
supervision is not a prerequisite to exemption from the antitrust laws where the actor is a
municipality rather than a private party).
166. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 442.700 - 442.760 (1995).
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fled. 167 The second prong of the Midcal test assuredly will be met by a
statutory grant of ultimate control to a supervisory state entity authorized
to continuously review conduct and overturn any activities that do not
further the goals of the state policy. So long as legislation contains such
safeguards, the state action exemption may be relied upon without
hesitation.
Relaxation of the federal antitrust laws is not the solution for the
health care industry to successfully adapt to recent structural changes.
"Competition, nurtured by sound antitrust policy, has resulted in innova-
tions that offer great potential to provide health care more efficiently
... ,"168 In those circumstances where competition would not be benefi-
cial to the public, the state, pursuant to the state action exemption, shall
remedy the imperfections as it deems necessary. Thus, the federal anti-
trust laws and state action immunity shall coexist harmoniously in polic-
ing the health care industry.
167. Jorde, supra note 62, at 236.
168. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 178.
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